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Evaluating unintended consequences: new insights into solving practical, ethical, and political 
challenges of evaluation 
Abstract: 
Evaluating complex interventions and policies is challenging. This is particularly true for the 
identification of unintended consequences, whether negative or positive. This paper uses data from a 
workshop with policymakers and evaluators to explore the evaluation of unintended consequences. 
We identify three main challenges for policymakers and evaluators: being able to identify and evaluate 
unintended effects, to avoid creating unintended effects, and being able to explain these effects. We 
discuss practical, political and ethical issues for each of these challenges, and identify 
recommendations for evaluators who want to consider unintended consequences. Firstly, use a 
broader range of methods to explore how policies play out. Secondly, use theory to plan evaluations, 
and thirdly discuss both methods and theory with relevant stakeholders to make these as useful as 
possible. We offer novel insights into recent debates about theory-led and co-produced interventions 
and policies. 
L’évaluation des interventions et politiques complexes est délicat, particulièrement en ce qui concerne 
l’identification des effets imprévus, qu'ils soient négatifs ou positifs. Cet article utilise 
des données provenant d’un colloque avec des décideurs politiques et les valuateurs sur l’évaluation 
des effets imprévus. Nous identifions trois défis principaux pour les décideurs politiques et les 
évaluateurs: identifier et évaluer les effets imprévus, les éviter, et les expliquer. Nous examinons les 
questions pratiques, politiques et éthiques pour chaque défi, et proposons des recommandations 
pour les évaluateurs qui souhaitent considérer les effets imprévus. Premièrement, utiliser une plus 
grande variété de méthodes pour examiner les effets des politiques; deuxièmement, utiliser la théorie 
pour planifier l’évaluation; et troisièmement, discuter les méthodes et la théorie avec les parties 
prenantes pour les rendre aussi utiles que possible. Nous offrons de nouvelles perspectives informant 
des débats récents sur les interventions et politiques coproduites fondées sur la théorie. 
 
Keywords: Unintended consequences; evaluation theory; coproduction; politics of evaluation; 
evaluation methods; ethics 
Background: Since its inception, evaluation science has identified the challenges of evaluating 
complex interventions and policies, particularly in complicated (multi-level and multi-site) and 
complex adaptive (emergent, non-linear) systems (Clark, 2013; Patton, 1994; Pawson and Tilley, 
1997; Rogers, 2008; Sanderson, 2002). These include practical, political, and ethical concerns, in 
addition to a multitude of methodological problems (Byrne and Callaghan, 2013). Despite these 
challenges, most people agree evaluation must still be prioritised. In addition to providing evidence 
about whether a policy has had an impact – expected or otherwise – it can identify promising ideas 
and failing ones, and contribute to incremental social change (Sanderson, 2000; Weiss, 1993, 1998). 
Importantly, it can enable democratic conversations about policy choices, by clarifying the political 
trade-offs and their implications (Weiss, 1993).  
As we know, the practice of evaluation is a political act, whereby only certain programmes and 
outcomes are evaluated; “conveying the message that other elements in the situation are either 
unimportant or that they are fixed and unchangeable” [pp.100 (Weiss, 1993). Evaluations can be 
used to indicate or suggest at weaknesses in programmes (so making them easier to challenge or 
shut down), close off debate or narrow policy options (Sanderson 200, Gray and Jenkins 1995. 
Negative findings can be buried by clients, arguing for more time, more money, better evaluation 
tools (Weiss, 1993). Evaluations are almost never from the point of view of participants, or those 
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affected, and  “might well lead to very different recommendations from those developed by an 
agency-oriented evaluator or a program official” (Weiss, 1993: 102). 
What would happen if evaluations did reflect users’ perspectives? We argue that evaluation must 
address the role of complexity in understanding social problems, social change, and evaluation of 
both. We often single out the intervention as the key independent variable, but this is a very 
reductionist way of thinking about social changes (Warren, 1973) which ignores structural and 
institutional structures which generate and sustain the problems of the target group. How this 
broader point should be addressed in terms of evaluation methodology is a topic of ongoing debate 
(Bonell et al., 2012; Egan et al., 2009), but it seems clear that many widely used evaluation 
techniques are not adequate to the challenges of situating interventions and policies in their socio-
political contexts. In particular, the use of methods such as randomised trials tends to focus 
evaluators’ attention on strategies which are well-defined and portable, and on proximal and readily 
quantifiable outcomes, even though an increasing body of evidence suggests that piecemeal 
approaches to create social change can surely not be effective (e.g. Adab et al., 2018).  
For Weiss, the answer was more integrated polices with “serious examination of the basic problem, 
how it is defined, what social phenomena nurture and sustain it, how it is related to other social 
conditions and social processes, and the total configuration of forces that have overwhelmed past 
program effects” (Weiss 1998:103). Of course, what is possible for evaluators in practice – given 
constraints of resource availability, political feasibility and so on – may fall well short of this ideal 
scenario. Seeing interventions as ongoing processes within complex systems may open up new 
possibilities for a deeper understanding of intervention, but it also raises challenging theoretical and 
practical problems as to which aspects of the total intervention-system nexus should be the main 
foci of evaluation. Commentators have called for less ambitious goals, more useful measures, 
consideration only of the most potent forms and elements of programmes (Bevan and Hood, 2006; 
Bjørnholt and Larsen, 2014; Pawson, 2008). However, this raises the question of what the aims of 
evaluation should be in any given context – questions which, of course, may be the subject of 
disagreement between the different actors involved in the evaluation process. 
The question of how to prioritise the evaluation process may be particularly challenging when it 
includes unintended consequences (UCs). As used here, UCs include both adverse effects and 
positive ‘spillover’ effects on outcomes or populations not envisaged by the originators of the 
intervention or policy. UCs have been recognised as a pervasive structural feature of social action 
since at least Merton (1936),1 and as an important dimension of the evaluation of interventions 
since at least Hirschman (1967). They are widely if sparsely identified in the evaluation and policy 
literature (Allen-Scott et al., 2014; Bamberger et al., 2016; Bonell et al., 2015; Loke et al., 2007; 
Lorenc and Oliver, 2013; Mittelmark, 2014), but there has been limited discussion of how 
policymakers and evaluators respond to evidence of UCs in practice. As ethical practitioners and 
researchers, it is incumbent upon us to ensure that we do no harm, either directly or through 
wasting resources on ineffective interventions (Hawe, 2015b; Moore and Evans, 2017). However, in 
many policy fields the identification and monitoring of adverse UCs has been at best ad hoc, and 
there is little clear guidance for evaluators or practitioners as to how to identify and respond to 
evidence that policies are doing harm. Understanding UCs may also be of value in refining our 
understanding of intervention mechanisms and their relation to the systemic context, and 
pinpointing inadequacies in mid-range theories of intervention – potentially mitigating the fact that, 
                                                             
1 Strictly speaking Merton speaks of unanticipated consequences, which is arguably a rather different idea {De 
Zwart, F. (2015). Unintended but not unanticipated consequences. Theory and Society, 44(3), 283-297.} 
However, his paper has widely been taken as the starting point for reflection on unintended consequences. 
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as Pawson says, “we are still inclined to launch makeshift interventional rockets without a solid 
theoretical base in social and behavioural science” (Pawson, 2018). More broadly, a clearer body of 
evidence on UCs could contribute to improved policy design and implementation.  
The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to move forward our understanding of unintended 
consequences and their evaluation, particularly: exploring the role that evaluation (of UCs) plays in 
the policy process; methodological challenges associated with evaluation of UCs; and ethical and 
normative issues associated with unintended consequences. We do this by presenting novel 
empirical data about policy actors’ own perceptions of the challenges and opportunities involved in 
evaluating with consideration for unintended consequences. 
 
Workshop on unintended consequences of policies 
This paper reports the findings of a workshop with senior policymakers and evaluators to explore the 
unintended consequences of public health and social policies. Workshop participants (n = 14) were 
split into two groups: Researchers and evaluators, and developers and implementers. We aimed to 
explore participants’ views on how evaluation should take account of UCs, what the challenges and 
constraints might be, and the ethics and logistics of evaluating unintended effects. We also wanted 
to explore scenarios where UCs were identified in evaluation, to think about what happened next, 
and whether the learning was captured and fed back into policy-making. Other sessions explored 
more general issues about why UCs arise and how adverse UCs can be avoided or mitigated; these 
findings have been reported elsewhere (under review), with this paper focusing on the evaluation 
messages. The write-up below contextualises our results by situating the workshop findings into 
current debates about evaluation methods and systems (see Table 1 for a summary). Where 
possible, key points raised by participants have been discussed in conjunction with debates in the 
literature. Similarly, where possible, cases or examples raised by participants have been referenced, 
for the convenience of the reader, but it should not be assumed that these were provided by 
participants unless otherwise indicated.  
We recognise that this is a relatively small number of participants, and that we have referred to 
‘researchers’ and ‘policymakers’ as generic categories, as did our participants. This risks glossing over 
the complexity of individual experiences, but we feel that this broader approach has value as a 
complement to more nuanced, in-depth studies of particular policies. We present this paper as novel 
empirical data about how different evaluators, researchers and policymakers understand and 
grapple with unintended consequences, not as a way of presenting a definitive account, but rather 
raising important methodological, theoretical, and normative questions about evaluation. With our 
participants, we have shaped some potential responses to these questions, which we hope will 
inspire thoughtful response in the wider evaluation community.  
Results: 
Participants acknowledged that unintended effects were common, and came about for a range of 
reasons including flawed policy design and implementation, unclear articulation of policy 
mechanisms or goals, or unclear or inappropriate evidence use, including evaluation techniques. 
Participants identified three main challenges: being able to identify and evaluate unintended effects, 
ensuring that the evaluation techniques themselves do not create the unintended effects, and being 
able to explain these effects. Participants also discussed possible solutions, including better use of 
theory, stakeholder engagement, and use of evidence. Perhaps unavoidably, the discussion tended 
to focus on unwanted, or otherwise negative unintended consequences. These may be more salient 
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to policymakers, or at least there is a more urgent desire to avoid them. However, both positive and 
negative effects can be unintended, and therefore the discussion below identifies both types.  
Table 1: Summary of discussion on evaluation of UCs 
 Practical issues Political issues Ethical issues 
Policy 
evaluation  - 
general 
issues 
Evaluation part of policy 
– need to produce 
impacts leads to 
outcome-focused 
policies 
 
Evaluations not done, 
done badly, or ignored 
Findings often not 
managed well or certain 
narratives prioritised 
Not always clear who does 
evaluations, why, or for 
what purpose.  
Challenge 1: 
Identifying 
UCs 
No regulator or 
reporting system for 
UCs of social / public 
policy 
 
Research funding 
system also militates 
against capture of UCs  
Lack of willingness to 
hear about UCs 
 
Political pressure to use 
particular methods, or 
select particular outcome 
Not everyone equally able 
to claim harms or make 
unintended consequences 
of policies widely known 
Challenge 2: 
Evaluating 
UCs 
Evaluation methods not 
well suited to 
identifying UCs 
 
Selected methods may 
not be optimal choice to 
capture the full range of 
effects and processes 
Asking for an evaluation 
gives the illusion of 
control  
 
‘Ownership’ of and 
responsibility for policy 
evaluation  
 
Evaluation audience may 
dictate scope and scale of 
evaluation, missing key 
indicators and outcomes  
 
 
Challenge 3: 
Explaining 
UCs 
Theory behind policy 
rarely articulated; UCs 
hard to explain. 
Policy narratives not 
always explicit, or may 
have different public / 
private versions 
Arguably unethical to 
commit resources where 
mechanisms of policy 
impact are not well 
understood 
 
 
The evaluation of policy  
Inevitably, the discussion also covered participants’ experiences with policy evaluation in general. 
The intertwined nature of evaluation and policy was emphasised, as well as the political character of 
choices about evaluation. In particular, several participants suggested that a policy culture where 
measurable impacts are strongly emphasised will shape what policies and interventions are likely to 
be implemented.  
Participants also suggested that the term ‘evaluation’ is highly polysemous. For example, one 
participant distinguished between a technocratic sense of evaluation (‘what works’) and a political 
sense (the ‘success’ of a policy as a function of the perceptions of other policymakers, the media or 
the public). Several participants emphasised the perceived need to maintain positive narratives 
about policies, which could lead to evaluation being ignored, added on as an afterthought, or poorly 
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designed (e.g. post-implementation). Partly in contrast, some participants drew a distinction 
between the maintenance of performative narratives about policy and the actual decisions and 
policy goals (e.g Nixon and Kissinger strengthening the narrative about aggressive bombing of 
Vietnam, while actually preparing to withdraw). Such public narratives may shape the statements 
made by elected politicians while having limited impact on their actual decisions. For example, 
ministers may change policy in the light of information about UCs, but not be able to publicly say so 
for fear of being accused of weakness or ‘U-turns’. In general, a public line may run in parallel with a 
separate policy development process.  
All these factors may shape how policies are understood in terms of their intended goals or 
outcomes, but considering UCs as a focus of evaluation further highlights the constraints and 
tensions involved. 
Challenge 1: Being able to identify unintended effects 
Workshop participants were split over whether UCs could be identified. Some participants felt it 
would never be practically possible to track every potential out-of-scope effect, whereas others felt 
that with improved policy testing and evaluation methods, UCs could be not only identified but 
addressed. However political constraints could mean that it was often considered unwise to seek out 
unexpected effects, as it could give the appearance of or raise uncertainty about the policy direction. 
More specifically, there seemed to be a link between the methodological and political challenges, in 
the sense that evaluating UCs often requires anticipating which UCs might be likely to occur. While 
this is also true of intended effects, the choices in that case are less likely to be controversial, since 
they translate the ‘official’ narrative of the intervention. In the case of UCs these choices are harder 
to justify, and may be rejected as arbitrary or unmotivated, which in turn means that evaluators are 
more politically exposed. Thus, thinking about UCs tends to cast doubt on the idea that the choice of 
which outcomes to collect data on can ever be purely technical and politically neutral. Of course, this 
also raises ethical questions about who gets to identify and claim unintended or harmful effects, 
with those most vulnerable being least likely to wield this political power.  
Several participants suggested that the framework of policy implementation is not ideal, and that in 
many policy fields, interventions usually do not undergo effectiveness and safety testing before 
being widely implemented. By contrast with clinical healthcare, most policy areas have no regulatory 
framework to collect and analyse reports of UCs. The identification and evaluation of UCs is usually 
ad hoc and unsystematic, and conducted within the context of commissioned research projects 
which may not adequately mitigate political pressures. Hence, UCs may often be missed.  
Challenge 2: Evaluating unintended effects 
Most participants agreed that usually, in practice, UCs were not evaluated. This was partly due to 
the (very real) practical issues, such as a lack of flexibility in current evaluation designs and systems. 
Some participants pointed to the challenges of interpreting mixed evaluation findings: evaluators 
may see mixed findings as contradictions to be resolved by improved methodology or interpretation, 
rather than opportunities to explore the complexity of intervention effects within a system, and to 
more fully characterise intervention processes. Evaluation methods can give rise to UCs through 
measurement techniques (Bjørnholt and Larsen, 2014) . For example, one participant described a 
police campaign to tackle drug-driving, which involved making more roadside stops. The aim was to 
reduce drug-driving, but the policy actually raised the number of arrests of organised criminals – a 
positive UC in itself, but partly an adverse UC in political terms, since it gave the impression of a 
worsening crime-rate.  
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There was a wide-ranging discussion about who ‘owned’ evaluations; in the sense of paid for 
controlled, acted on, and responsible for. Some felt that policymakers were themselves the 
‘stewards’ of evaluation, even when not directly involved. However, policymakers’ own sense of 
ownership of policies varies widely over time and between different policy actors, which may affect 
their resistance to evidence of adverse UCs, and whether or not UCs are reported. Some funders are 
tolerant of ‘failure’ as long as there is some learning, although the churn in policy staff may mitigate 
against this. The relevance of UCs may also depend on the political goals of those commissioning or 
using evaluation evidence: for example, whether evaluation is intended to inform decisions about 
disinvestment, or to defend a particular policy position. Evaluators themselves, even when formally 
independent, may learn to anticipate such political and practical challenges and de-emphasise 
unwanted findings in their reporting of evaluation data, in order to maintain positive relationships or 
access future funding opportunities. Indeed, evaluators may need a higher standard of proof to have 
the dialogue about UCs, particularly adverse UCs, than they do with positive intended effects.  
Participants also recognised that evaluation (from choosing what to evaluate, selecting design and 
targets, to dissemination) was a valuing process – but it wasn’t always clear exactly whose values 
were being operationalised. The people targeted by interventions, or those involved in delivering 
them ‘on the ground,’ may have different and complementary perspectives to those brought by 
policymakers or evaluators. Policies are sometimes designed on the basis of what can be measured, 
rather than on what can be changed. Indeed, goal-setting is a technical exercise and conducted by 
administrators or political elites – not by those affected by policies. Measuring is a political activity, 
framing and limiting, which are therefore not neutral or rational (Bjørnholt and Larsen, 2014), and 
can be acted on politically. McLean et al describe an initiative to increase the ‘number of swims per 
square foot of pool area’, where this outcome could hypothetically be achieved by closing pools 
(McLean et al., 2007) – an outcome which is absurd in a practical sense, although coherent within the 
logic of measurement.  
Challenge 3: Explaining these effects 
Participants argued that even where evidence of UCs was gathered, the explanatory power of 
evaluations to account for them was limited. The political factors discussed above which hinder the 
identification and reporting of UCs will also tend to limit attention to their causal explanation. 
However, there are also methodological challenges. Methods which rely on statistical hypothesis-
testing such as RCTs can only incorporate a limited number of pre-defined outcomes, and hence are 
likely to miss many UCs, while retrospective data-mining approaches (as one participant put it: 
“identify a huge bucket of indicators and run clever statistical analyses”) may be too diffuse to offer 
real insight.  The lack of theory in driving evaluation questions, designs and methods was discussed 
by participants, and it was noted that no significant attention had yet been paid to how to develop 
theories of harm, or operationalise these into evaluation processes. 
Participants felt that it was ethical to only commit resources to interventions where there is sound 
reason to believe that it targets mechanisms which have a realistic chance of bringing about positive 
change. Otherwise we risk directing scarce resources toward interventions which are negligible in 
their effects, or even negligent (Hawe 2015b, quoted in Moore 2017).  
Possible solutions 
This meant that there was a strong ethical and moral imperative to address the issue of UCs, as well 
as a methodological argument for incorporating as wide a range of perspectives as possible into 
evaluations. Involving people who are affected, and other stakeholders, in evaluation planning 
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(known as ‘empowerment evaluation’) but may facilitate better evaluation and buy-in to the 
outcomes of the evaluation (which may be particularly difficult if there is evidence of adverse UCs). 
However, some participants reported that these more inclusive forms of evaluation are seen as 
lacking rigour. How then should evaluators ad policymakers respond to identified unintended 
consequences, and what are the solutions to the challenges above? 
Responding to UCs: 
Adverse unexpected effects could lead to strong emotional reactions amongst policymakers (denial, 
grief, anger) when policies they had personally invested in had not gone as planned. Personal, not 
just organisational or institutional responses, were important to consider when thinking about the 
politics of UCs. Policies which were seen to have failed (unexpectedly or not) were difficult to 
manage. There was significant pressure to simply ignore inconvenient evaluation findings, and even 
to create data in response to this pressure.  
Participants agreed that policymakers and evaluators should recognise that a suite of interventions 
is usually required to achieve sustainable change in an outcome, while accepting that trade-offs 
would need to be made and that researchers and implementers had different expectations and may 
need to agree to disagree. They also suggested that adequate understanding of UCs was more likely 
where evaluators were able to: 
 define the output of evaluations in advance 
 achieve a conversation about the overall story of an intervention or a policy – leading to a 
revision of the underlying theory 
 list consequences, setting out the theory of change with stakeholders, and consider risks  
 continually and iteratively revisit the theory of change throughout implementation 
 
On a practical level, participants emphasised the need for flexibility in designing evaluations, for 
example by piloting interventions, incorporating greater deliberation at the design stage, including 
break points or get-out clauses to reduce sunk costs during implementation, or implementing 
adaptive methodologies which can take account of shifting policy priorities during the evaluation 
period. However, some participants felt that research funders and commissioners were a barrier to 
the uptake of such methods, since they tended to emphasise protocol-driven methodologies and to 
expect researchers to produce an a priori evaluation plan and stick to it. (However, it was recognised 
that there was variation in this respect, with some funders more open to adaptive methods.). In 
general, participants argued that understanding UCs requires a pluralistic approach both to methods 
for policy evaluation and to processes of policy implementation.  
Solutions 
1. Methods: Firstly, participants discussed how to improve evaluation design. This would mean 
requiring commitment and honesty from evaluation funders. For example, it should ideally be clear 
whether a given evaluation is intended to improve the details of programme implementation details, 
or to inform decisions about investment or disinvestment. Participants emphasised the importance 
of agreement that evaluation is about trying to build a model to better understand what is 
happening. Setting the evaluation question was seen as a crucial opportunity to get these things 
right, by discussing: what decisions they were taking, who the evaluation is aimed at, assessing what 
level of ‘success’ is good enough, and how to measure it.  
The discussion on methods centred around a need to recognised that rigour is about transparency of 
processes, and not a quality of certain research designs (particularly the RCT). The over-reliance on 
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the RCT was seen as driving certain types of questions focusing on a limited range of measurable 
outcomes, which hampers evaluators’ ability to collect data on UCs. More broadly, the language and 
culture of RCTs shape assumptions about policy goals and drivers which may not facilitate a deeper 
understanding of how interventions function in context. However, the RCT was recognised as a 
useful method to test experimental questions, although not easily adapted to changing 
circumstances, or good at addressing broader processes and hence developing a better 
understanding of UCs.  
Participants discussed a range of methods which could potentially improve identification and 
explanation of UCs. Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) was suggested for analysis of policy 
effects and policy design. QCA allows for the possibility of multiple causation and may help 
policymakers think about ‘types’ of people and possible responses which could inform 
implementation. Cost implications of different assemblages could be estimated.  
Participants strongly agreed that process evaluation and process data should be much more 
prominent in evaluations, otherwise people end up with evidence that UC have occurred but no 
understanding of why. However, it was recognised that this is difficult and involves potentially 
contentious choices on the part of evaluators. As already noted, several participants felt that 
evaluations which incorporate a range of perspectives will be better equipped to engage with UC. 
Decisions about granularity of results, targets, outcomes and so on needed to be much more open 
and transparent. In general, evaluators and commissioners needed to be more open about the 
critical and non-critical dimensions of evaluation, and the political and social dimensions which were 
the most important.  
2. Better engage with, develop and apply theory: Participants recommended several models of 
evaluation to address these questions, including realist evaluation, QCA, and Process Tracing. What 
these methods all have in common is an attempt to articulate the mechanisms underpinning social 
change, or the theory which explains it. Participants spent significant time discussing how to improve 
the development of theory to underpin policies, and to underpin the evaluation of these policies. 
Suggestions included increased piloting of policies and innovations to identify different sets of 
interactions; to test key assumptions in the theory of change, and to keep re-ranking assumptions; 
and to concurrently run and revise the policy design and evaluation. One practical suggestion was to 
make greater use of risk registers, which are already completed for all policies to identify key risks 
throughout the process. Initially hypothetical, each risk is given a likelihood and weighted. Mitigation 
plans can be written, capturing contrary views and allowing feedback loops. Over time, as these are 
revised, the risk register becomes less a blueprint and more of a living document capturing what 
occurs on the ground.  
3. Work with relevant stakeholders to produce theory-based evaluations. Evaluations which 
incorporate a range of viewpoints are likely to be more useful, and acted on. The coproduction of 
theories could help evaluators and policymakers to better grasp why polices have the effects they 
do, and to be able to collect relevant evidence to document these. Bonell et al describe a process to 
formulate evaluations of harmful effects (Bonell et al., 2015): 
1. Scrutinising the assumptions underpinning the theory for the intervention’s (positive) effects 
2. Identifying inputs to interventions, processes and mechanisms by which these components 
are meant to lead to outcomes 
3. Reflecting on unintended interactions between the agency of stakeholders and the social 
structures which constrain them 
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4. Drawing on existing mid-range sociological and psychological theories 
The next step is to translate this into an operationalisable evaluation framework, and most 
importantly, build theory to enable more effective prevention in the future. Our workshops also 
suggest that working with multiple stakeholders, through a managed process of collaboration, would 
help evaluators and researchers to identify key theories, components and agents. As Weiss put it, 
“As we gain deeper awareness of the complexities and interrelationships that maintain problem 
behaviour, perhaps we can develop coherent, integrated mutually supportive sets of activities, 
incentives, regulations, and rewards that represent a concerted attack and begin to deserve the title 
of policy” (Weiss 1993: p105). 
Discussion 
Policies and interventions can have unintended consequences, but unexpected effects are not 
routinely sought by evaluators. This matters, because policies could be operating in ways which we 
don’t understand, and they could be harming populations. In addition, unintended effects are likely 
to be underreported, and evaluation plans and resources are usually too fixed to be able to pick 
them up. There are significant political, practical and ethical challenges around the evaluation of UCs 
which highlight the need to better understand the aims of policies, the mechanisms by which they 
work, and to improve the evaluation of policies. 
The role of evaluation in the policy process 
Exploring unintended consequences shows that methodological and political concerns play out in 
the practice of evaluation, and that evaluation plays an important role in the policy process itself. 
Weiss argued that evaluation was political in three ways: evaluations are conducted on policies 
which are the product of political processes, evaluation reports become one part of the evidence 
jigsaw for politicians, and finally, evaluation is political itself – by the questions it asks, the roles it 
imposes on evidence and on scientists, and by the statements it makes about legitimate policies and 
policy reform (Weiss, 1993). The existence of unintended consequences not only points up the gaps 
in the empirical knowledge generated by evaluation – particularly our understanding of why policies 
have the effects they do – but raises troubling ethical questions about how far this knowledge 
should be taken into account in formulating and implementing policy.  
From a methodological perspective, selecting relevant outcomes and methods; deriving evaluation 
plans through implicit or explicitly-understood theories, and interpreting and acting on findings are 
methodological and political choices. The challenges of identifying unknown unknowns was 
recognised by participants, who suggested potential solutions including use of a large toolkit of 
evaluation approaches, and better use of theory in the development of evaluating planning. Being 
able to evaluate unintended as well as anticipated consequences would imply a truly holistic 
approach to evaluation. This could be achieved by inclusion of stakeholders, potentially in the co-
production of theories of change, and using these to develop evaluation plans. Developing theories 
of change with stakeholders, using collaborative methods, is not a new suggestion (Connell et al., 
1995). The Theories of Change Evaluation developed by Aspen outlines steps to agree a programme 
theory which “is acceptable to stakeholder because of its existing evidence based or because it 
seems likely to be true in a normative sense”(Blamey and Mackenzie, 2007: 443). It attempts to 
create community engagement and ownership of the programme and evolution through their 
collaborative process, but are concerned mainly with what to do (implementation theory). 
Stakeholders agree what will constitute success, and what the causal pathways would be. 
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On the other hand, Realist Evaluation (Pawson and Tilley, 1997) also proposes discussion with 
implementers to map out mid-level theories about how different intervention participants will be 
affected by the intervention, and to test these theories with a range of methodological techniques. 
This process implies that the evaluator should look at as broad a range of possible mechanisms as 
possible (Pawson, 2008). However, where these theories are unclear or conflicting, realist evaluation 
theory implicitly puts the evaluator in the position of adjudicating between them, a position which 
seems incompatible with seeing the evaluator as one among many political actors. More generally, it 
tends to imply that the reality of the intervention process is exhausted by the sum of implementers’ 
and evaluators’ theories – an assumption which leaves little room for UCs which may be 
unanticipated by any of the actors involved.  
Theories of Change is therefore good at providing broad strategic learning implementation theory, 
(Blamey and Mackenzie, 2007)  but can be beset with problems where programmes are unclear, or 
poorly implemented (Bauld 2005). Realist evaluation is good at understanding processes and micro 
interactions, but may not adequately reflect the complex and conflictual process involved in large-
scale intervention processes. Yet, bringing elements of these approaches together might be a good 
way to generate evidence-informed policy, by ensuring that the theories of change which are subject 
to testing and refinement in the evaluation process are grounded in shared ownership of the 
programme or policy and broad agreement about its goals. This process may be challenging, as 
stakeholders have to examine their assumptions about how programmes work, but this kind of 
developmental evaluation can help to refine logic models. (Patton, 1994, 2010).  
Additionally, this kind of responsive process would enable evaluators to deal with emergent 
outcomes (versus pre-identified), non-linearity, recursive loops and disproportionate outcomes, and 
alternative causal strands (Rogers, 2008); in other words, with the hallmarks of complexity as 
opposed to complicatedness (Rutter et al., 2017). Where the challenges of complicatedness derive 
from the interaction of multiple stakeholders with divergent expectations  – which, as noted, is 
implicitly the focus of the mapping of programme theories in much realist evaluation – the 
challenges of complexity derive from the possibility of emergent events which transcend these 
expectations. Importantly, these may include positive UCs as well as adverse ones. Particularly 
where interventions are genuinely shared with implementers and stakeholders, they may benefit 
from the agency of the latter – for example in creatively adapting the intervention to the context, or 
in finding ways round unanticipated obstacles – in ways which cannot in principle be anticipated by 
linear causal theories. As suggested by Hirschman (1967: 160-188; cf Lepenies, 2008), UCs may be a 
resource as much as a threat. Methods which allow evaluators or practitioners to identify and 
manage risks, which are at least partly foreseeable and quantifiable (such as risk registers), may not 
be able to adequately deal with the radical uncertainty to which truly complex systems are subject.  
Ethical and normative issues  
This also underlines that the ethical and political dimensions of evaluation cannot be separated from 
questions of methodology (Stame, 2018). The goal of adequately accounting for UCs in complex 
systems is bound up with the project of making evaluations more democratic: independent, not 
accepting of contingencies on their activities, and promoting democratic ideals (House, 2015). Weiss 
argued that few evaluations had “had a noticeable effect on the making and remaking of public 
policy” (Weiss, 1993: 98) , a view shared by some of the participants in the present study. This is a 
stringent test for evaluations, and probably mischaracterises policy change as a top-down process. 
Rather, if we share the hope that evaluations can affect public decision-making (Bjørnholt and 
Larsen, 2014; Dahler-Larsen, 2011), even if non-linearly, shared policy aims, and shared evaluations 
would help resources to be distributed more effectively. That is, giving up the claim to 
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epistemological mastery does not reduce evaluators’ ethical responsibility, but if anything makes it 
more demanding (Schwandt 2018). Clearly, the solutions proposed by ourselves and our participants 
to the challenges of evaluation are not available to all evaluators, nor would all evaluators feel they 
are appropriate or necessary. Evaluators are motivated by diverse interests and hold different views 
about their role in the policy and practice arena. In this paper, we have described some of the 
normative and ethical challenges which are uncovered by examining unintended consequences. 
Much more attention must be given to developing a diverse set of responses to these challenges. 
Our proposals above regarding ‘holistic evaluation’ are a first step towards one possible response, 
but many others are possible. 
For those with an interest in increasing the use of evidence in policymaking, this study has some 
clear implications. Firstly, we must recognise that researchers, practitioners and implementers learn 
through evaluation, as well as the policymakers. (Hawe, 2015a). Next, as we know, policymakers are 
most likely to act on evidence which is useful to them. But beyond ‘another case of ‘policy-based 
evidence’, this  illustrates the importance of shared criteria for credible evidence; shared 
assumptions, share belief in the process, and shared ideas about what good and useful evidence 
looks like.  As Weiss knew “evaluation result are not likely to be persuasive to those for whom other 
values have a higher priority” [pp.98) – so achieving agreement around values is essential.  
Additionally, policymakers rarely commit themselves to directions or specifics (Ettelt et al., 2015) 
How, then, can these shared criteria be developed and adhered to? Our study suggests that making 
values and decisions clear, acknowledging tradeoffs, and thinking through agency of actors in a 
collaborative discussion would be a good start.  (Porter, 2015) Helping all stakeholders use 
appropriate theory, demonstrating a “clear understanding of how the problem under consideration 
is created and sustained in context” (Moore and Evans, 2017) is only possible through genuine 
collaborative discussion. However, this is at present an open question. Some important avenues for 
further exploration have been identified by this study, including to what extent have scholars 
grappled with the reality of unintended consequences as experienced by policymakers; whether 
holistic evaluation should, or always does imply collaborative working with stakeholders, and to 
what extent joint inquiry is a plausible mode of evaluation (see, e.g. Prainsack et al., 2010); the role 
of evaluation in the policy process more generally, and finally the ethics and normative frameworks 
which govern our responses to unintended consequences.  
Conclusions 
Exploring the nature and challenges of unintended effects can shed new light on the challenges of, 
and possible solutions to, the evaluation of complex policy problems. Practically, evaluating UCs is 
challenging, as we have inflexible funding, a dearth of reliable data, and fixed protocols which 
enforces the measurement of outcomes we can (or are allowed to), which  itself affects questions 
we ask (Parkhurst and Abeysinghe, 2016). Politically, challenges include the need for success 
narratives, the drive to act quickly rather than strategically, and the policy process itself. Ethically, 
the evaluation of UCs shows us that evaluation practices means making decisions about what to 
evaluate and how, and balancing pros and cons of policies is an ethical choice which is often ignored 
or side stepped. 
Evaluation itself can create the appearance of unintended effects, yet the political environment can 
dictate methods used. And evaluations can often miss important changes in context, during process, 
or outside of main timeframe. Evaluations can be conducted to measure scale and scope of impact, 
to assess value for money, inform future planning, and ensure accountability. Methodological rigour 
is important, but ideally mixed methods should be used to address theory-informed questions. (ICAP 
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2010). One way to do this is to privilege stakeholder experiences in the coproduction of 
interventions and evaluations, which requires the active management of group dynamics and politics 
(Maini et al., 2018). 
In summary, evaluation researchers have proposed a number of ways to improve evaluations in 
order to capture what interventions do and how they work: By using theory, involving stakeholders, 
and being adaptive. Yet, using the lens of unintended consequences, it is clear that a combination of 
these approaches is required to evaluate public health interventions and policies, in a way which will 
inform us about how social change occurs in complex systems.  
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